The Idea of Hegel’s Science of Logic by Stanley Rosen

Author:Stanley Rosen [Rosen, Stanley]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: The University of Chicago Press
Published: 2013-03-14T16:00:00+00:00

ELEVEN

The Nature of Essence

Introductory Remarks

I began a previous chapter with a discussion of John Locke as a kind of anticipation of, or transitional state to, Hegel’s treatment of essence. We recall that in the tradition started by the Greeks, the internal structure of a being or on, in its Latin derivative, entity (ens, entitas), is derived from a fundamental principle that is most fully articulated by Aristotle. To be is to be something, of such and such a kind. This basic axiom has two corollaries. First: to be is to be self-identical, i.e., to possess a differentiated unity that permits identification because it endures as the being of the thing itself. Second: we identify a thing in two steps; first by apprehending or grasping it as a unified structure by way of its particular look or form, but second, by expressing discursively what we have seen, i.e., by answering the question “what is it?” The answer to the question “what is it?” has two stages. We can answer by giving a name, if we happen already to know how the thing in question is referred to in our language, or if we have just decided upon the name we wish to use for such references. But the act of naming is not a real answer to the question “what is it?” because, if I am told that the thing in question is, say, an orange, the question legitimately arises, “what is an orange?” A genuine answer to our question is grounded in the internal structure of the differentiated unity. We cannot simply identify anything by calling it an identity, i.e., by applying to it the law of identity, “A = A,” because this law applies to everything. Identification, or the accurate or at least satisfactory answer to the question “what is it?,” requires us to restate the two features of the axiom noted initially in the particular terms of the internal structure about which we are speaking. The axiom, to repeat, says that to be is to be this particular thing of such and such a kind. The answer must state which kind. But this is not enough, as we can easily see in the case of the orange. An orange is a kind of fruit. But so is an apple and a grape. So we require a further characteristic of the orange that will tell us which kind of fruit it is. That is, we require some property of the kind “orange” that belongs to the more general kind “fruit” that differentiates the species (as we can conveniently refer to it) of the genus of fruit.

The structure that underlies definition by genus and difference is rooted in the assumption that we can distinguish the features of the differentiated unity of a thing into two kinds, essential and accidental. Let us pretend that the genus of the orange is “fruit” and the difference is “citrus.” But fruit is marked by various properties like seeds, flesh, shape, color, and so on.

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